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POLITICAL REPRESSION AND CHILD LABOR: 







Most normative studies on child labor arrive at the conclusion that child labor is detrimental 
to social welfare. Child labor is, however, still prevalent in many developing countries even 
though in many of these countries it is forbidden by law. In this paper we develop a political-
economic model that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labor legislation. The 
most important implication of our model is that in countries with repressive political regimes 
enforcement is more lenient and child labor thus more prevalent than in countries enjoying 
political freedom. We test this implication and find that it is confirmed by the data. 
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of child labor is widespread in the developing world. Recent 
investigations carried out by the ILO´s Bureau of Statistics estimate that in the 
developing countries at least 120 million children between 5 and 15 are working full 
time, and more than twice as many (or about 250 millions) work on a part-time basis. 
This is so even though child labor is illegal in 115 countries including many 
developing countries of Latin America and Africa where child labor is especially 
widespread (see ILO, 2002).  
The observed prevalence of child labor appears to contradict recent theoretical 
findings that indicate that child labor is likely to reduce social welfare [see, for 
example, Ranjan (1999), Baland and Robinson (2000) and Dessy and Pallage (2001)]. 
Why do governments not combat child labor with more zeal?  Why do they not punish 
parents who are observed to send their children to work more severely? In this paper 
we develop a political-economic model that explains this puzzle. Our explanation is 
based on the idea that the educated elite or their children may suffer an income loss if 
the number of educated people increases. If the educated elite has more political power 
than the uneducated masses, the political process may well give rise to a lenient 
enforcement of restrictive child labor legislations. Identifying the political power of 
the educated upper class with oligarchic political repression, we thus hypothesize that 
the prevalence of child labor resulting from the endogenous leniency of law 
enforcement varies positively with the degree of repression of the political system.  
The political economy of child labor policy is still pretty much a white spot on the 
map of the economic research agenda. The normative literature on child labor, 
however, is by now quite well developed and covers various aspects of child labor [cf.   2
Basu (1999)]. One of them is the supply of child labor. Rosenzweig (1981) and Goldin 
(1979), for example, apply a static neo-classical approach in which parents decide, 
among other things, how the time of their children is allocated between school and 
work. This approach is extended by Parsons and Goldin (1979) and Cigno (2000) who 
adopt a dynamic view. Gupta (2000) does not assume price taking households but uses 
the concept of Nash bargaining instead: parents and employers bilaterally negotiate the 
wages of the children. Another strand of the literature analyses the impact of child 
labor on social welfare and derives conditions that justify government interventions. 
Basu and Van (1998), Basu (1999) and Dessy (2000) show that labor markets may 
exhibit multiple equilibria with a „good“ equilibrium in which children do not work 
and a „bad“ one in which child labor exists. They argue that a ban on child labor (Basu 
and Van) or compulsory education (Basu, Dessy) may jolt an economy from the „bad“ 
to the „good“ equilibrium. According to Bell and Gersbach (2001), a better way to 
accomplish this transition may be a tax-transfer-program that taxes the rich households 
during the transition. Baland and Robinson (2000) consider capital market 
imperfections and show how borrowing constraints can give rise to child labor. 
Moreover, they show that even a soft constraint on child labor, i.e. a regulation which 
reduces the time children are allowed to work, may result in a significant Pareto 
improvement. Ranjan (1999) proposes to overcome capital market imperfections either 
by introducing a functioning credit market or by providing financial support for poor 
families. Dessy and Pallage (2001) argue that child labor may be the result of a 
coordination failure between parents who decide whether to invest in the human 
capital of their children and firms that decide whether to invest in skill based 
technology. Also in this case, a ban on child labor will result in a Pareto improvement.   3
None of these models, however, gives an answer to the question why child labor still 
exists in many developing countries. Put differently: Why do governments in 
developing countries not always choose the most efficient policy to combat child 
labor? In a recent paper Shelburne (2001) moves toward the analysis of this puzzle. 
Shelburne analyses the stakes of the factor owners and identifies the gainers and losers 
from child labor. Making use of a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with two goods 
and two factors (capital and labor, but skilled and unskilled labor would do just as 
well), he shows that in a closed economy the originally employed factors gain 
collectively from instituting child labor, whereas in a small open economy none of the 
original factors experiences a change in welfare from the addition of child workers. 
Based on these overall welfare effects Shelburne hypothesizes that economies open to 
international trade are less likely to suffer from child labor. He then goes on to show 
that this hypothesis cannot be rejected by a cross-country regression including 103  
countries. 
Shelburne himself is quite aware that his study does not really qualify as a fully 
fledged political-economic theory because of his model’s focus on the overall effects 
on the non-child-labor factors. In his model capital unambiguously gains and labor 
loses from child labor in a closed economy. The reason is that child labor increases the 
relative labor endowment thereby decreasing the wage rate and increasing the capital 
rental. In a small open economy, on the other hand, the factor price equalization 
mechanism is at work, implying that child labor incidence has no effect on factor 
remuneration. A political economy model would therefore assume the capitalists to 
have more political power than the workers and then argue that increased openness to 
international trade reduces the capitalists’ stake in soft child labor policies. Moreover, 
notice that the economic consequences of child labor that are analyzed in Shelburne’s   4
model derive exclusively from the endowment effect, i.e. from the fact that child labor 
increases a country’s endowment with the factor labor. Even though this effect might 
well be sizable – Shelburne (p. 326) mentions estimates of over ten per cent of the 
labor force in some developing countries – a static analysis cannot capture the 
consequences of the arguably much more significant long-run losses associated with 
the fact that child labor always implies a loss in human capital investment.  
In this paper we show how the political economy and the human capital aspect can be 
integrated in a model extending Shelburne’s imaginative analysis. We thus firmly base 
our portrait of the political process on the political economy view and focus on the 
dynamic consequences of child labor, i.e. on the trade-off between current and future 
disposable income in a model that allows human capital formation via education.
1 In 
section 2, we outline our model. We assume that parents are not able to borrow money 
to finance the education of their children. If the government is inactive, child labor 
thus prevails in our economy due to imperfect capital markets. We then go on to show 
that imposing a penalty for sending children to work would decrease the incidence of 
child labor and increase the share of educated workers.  A social welfare motivated 
government would thus set the most efficient penalty, i.e. the highest penalty which is 
legally possible. Child labor policy is endogenized in section 3. We show in particular 
that more repressive political regimes adopt a more lenient enforcement of child labor 
                                                           
1 In order to focus on the dynamic effects, we neglect the static endowment effect of 
child labor. In this sense our analysis complements Shelburne’s study.   5
legislation which translates into a higher incidence of child labor.
2 In section 4 we test 
this hypothesis using a panel data set covering 103 developing economies.  
 
2. The model of the economy 
We consider a closed economy with overlapping generations. Individuals live for three 
periods. In the first period they are children, in the second they become adults who 
work, give birth to a child and decide whether to send this child to school or to work. 
At the end of the second period of the parents’ life, the children leave home and the 
parents keep on working in the third period in which no decisions are made. The only 
relevant private decision the individuals make during their whole life is whether to 
send their children to school or to work.  
There are thus two types of adult individuals or workers: educated and uneducated 
ones. Each worker’s labor supply is exogenous and normalized to unity; income 
therefore corresponds to the wage rate. The income 
u
ti y  of an uneducated or unskilled 
adult worker i in period t and the income 
s
tj y  of a educated or skilled  adult worker j in 
period t depends on the prevailing share ωt of skilled workers in the economy and the 
individual worker’s ability  bi or  bj. We use the following specification:
3 
                                                           
2 We thus focus in this paper on political repression, i.e. the absence of political 
freedom. For various studies of economic freedom see the special volume of the 
European Journal of Political Economy edited and introduced by de Haan (2003). 
3 The specification of the equations (1) is based on a microfoundation employed by 
Owen and Weil (1998, p.75-76) who assume an aggregate production function 
Y=F(K,L), where the aggregate labor input L is a function of uneducated and educated   6
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ti y   of an unskilled parent increases with the share  t ω  of skilled workers, 
while the opposite holds for the income 
s
tj y  of a skilled parent since a higher share  t ω  
of educated individuals directly translates in a higher supply of skilled relative to 
unskilled labor.  
Children’s abilities are assumed to be independent of their parent’s ability; they are 
uniformly distributed over the support [1,2]. Moreover, we assume that (as – qs) > (a u 
+  qu), implying that if a skilled worker has the same ability as an unskilled worker, the 
skilled worker will always receive a higher income than the unskilled one.  
Parents are not able to borrow money for the education of their children. If parent m 
sends her child to work, she receives the following utility in the first period of her 
adult life: 
(2)  11 ln( )
work k
mm c Uy y E p π =+ − − ,      (k =u,s),         
                                                                                                                                                                                     
labor input in efficiency units: L=L(U,E). Factors are paid their marginal products. 
The economy is assumed to be open to the world capital market so that the world 
interest rate r=FK and the marginal product FL of a unit of aggregate labor will be 
constant. The wages (or incomes) per efficiency unit are then yU=FLLU and yE=FLLE 
which implies via U=N-E that yU varies positively and yE varies negatively with the 
share E/N of educated labor. In equation (1) we assume for analytical convenience a 
linear functional relationship between the incomes and the share of educated labor ω 
in the labor force.         7
 where yc is the income generated by a working child. Notice that yc as well as 
u
ti y  in 
(1) do not depend on the number of children working because we suppress the 
“endowment effect” of child labor (see note 1). The exogenous variable E  denotes the 
emotional cost of sending one’s child to work; this cost arises from violating a social 
norm denouncing child labor.
4 Child labor is assumed to be illegal. The term πp 
represents the expected costs of some kind of non-monetary punishment for violating 
the child labor laws; π denotes the probability of detection and p the cost of the 
imposed punishment.  
If, on the other hand, parent m sends her child to school, she receives the following 
utility: 
(3)     11 ln( ),
school k
mm Uy C =−  
where C represents schooling costs. Notice, that the specifications of (2) and (3) imply 
that no savings are made. This is in line with our assumption that functioning credit 
markets do not exist. Moreover, we assume that no transfers between adult children 
and parents take place because we do focus on traditional economic reasoning and not 
on altruistic motives which may be determined by class-specific cultures. The utility in 
the second period of adult life thus has the following appearance: 
(4)     22 ln( )
k
mm Uy = . 
The parents’ decision whether to send their children to work or to school is based on a 
utility comparison. An unskilled parent i sends her child to school, if 
 
                                                           
4 Katav-Herz (2001) analyses a model in which E varies negatively with the share of 
working children.     8
(5)     
ln[ ( ) ] ln[ ( ) ] 0
u school work
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and a skilled parent j sends her child to school, if 
(6)   
ln[ ( ) ] ln[ ( ) ] 0
s school work
j j s j s j st s j st s c U U U b aq Cb aq y E p ωω π ∆≡ − = − −− − ++ + ≥ . 
Since 
k
m U ∆  is increasing in the ability bm,
5 it is the more able and thus richer parents in 
each of the two groups that send their children to school, the critical ability levels bs
* 
and bu
* for the skilled and unskilled amounting to 
(7)    
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, i.e. as the share  t ω  of skilled workers increases, 
more educated parents will have to send their children to work, whereas the converse 
is true for the uneducated ones.
6 Moreover, it can easily be seen that the numerator of 
the expression in (7) decreases and the denominator increases with an increase of the 






bk  for k=s,u: an increase in the penalty p will induce 
more parents to send their children to school. 












, where the subscript d denotes disposable income and 
()
u
uu t Ya q ω ≡+ and  ()
s
s st Ya q ω ≡− ”basic” income. 
6 To be sure, in an economy that exhibits positive externalities of education the 
negative effect of ωt on 
*
s b  may be softened or even reversed.   9
 Let now µt denote the share of young skilled workers in the labor force in period t. 
Among these workers, those with an ability exceeding bs*  send their children to 
school. The fraction of these workers amounts to
* 2 s b − .
7 The share of young unskilled 
parents is 1-µ t, and among these parents, those with an ability exceeding 
*
u b  send their 
children to school. The fraction of these parents amounts to 
* 2 u b − . If δ t denotes the 
share of children going to work, the share 1-δ t of children going to school then equals  
(8)      
** 1 ( 2) ( 1) ( 2) tt s t u bb δµ µ −= − + − − . 
The share of children going to school today equals the share of skilled workers 
tomorrow; we thus have 1 1 tt δ µ + −= . Since we assume a constant population (one 
child per parent), the share ωt of skilled workers in the economy is simply the average 
of the share µt of young skilled workers and the share of old skilled workers (which in 
period t equals µt-1):  ) (
2
1
1 − + = t t t µ µ ω . Substituting the critical skill levels given in 
(7) into equation (8) and observing that 1-δt=µt+1 and  ) (
2
1
1 − + = t t t µ µ ω , we receive 
the following dynamic system equation: 
(9)     = +1 t µ  
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7 Notice, that the schooling decision of the parent is not based on the ability of the 
child. The ability distribution of the educated and uneducated adult population is 
therefore also uniform over the support [1,2].   10
We do not need to analyze the dynamic stability properties of this non-linear second-
order difference equation in detail.  It suffices to show with the help of numerical 
examples that a large set of parameter constellations exist for which our dynamic 
system possesses a dynamically stable interior steady state  *( 0 , 1 ) µ ∈ , i.e. a steady 
state that exhibits coexistence of child labor and schooling. A representative example 
is provided in Appendix 1. 
In a steady state, of course, the skill distribution does not vary across generations and 
we have 
1-δ* = µ*= ω*. 
That is, the steady state share of children attending school is equal to the share of old 
and young educated workers in the economy. The steady state can thus be 
characterized by the implicit function 
(10)    ** 2 ( 1* ) 2 0
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Dynamic stability of our system (9) requires that  /* 0 F µ ∂ ∂> .
8 Assuming dynamic 
stability we can proceed to derive from equation (10) via the correspondence principle 
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We thus have  
 
Proposition 1: 
A higher penalty p for sending children to work gives rise to an increase in the steady 
state value of the share of children attending school. In other words, a benevolent 
government is able to reduce the incidence of child labor by increasing the penalty p.  
 
A numerical example provided in Appendix 1 shows the dynamic adjustment process 
that takes place after a permanent increase in p. 
Since we observe in many developing countries lenient enforcement of the prohibition 
of child labor, we cannot portray government with the help of a social welfare 
maximizer. In the following section we therefore endogenize child labor policy by 
using a political support maximizing government. We thereby focus on one policy 
instrument, namely the penalty p for sending children to work. 
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 for k=u,s.   12
3. Endogenous Child Labor Policy 
We assume that the political decision concerning the severity of the penalty for 
sending children to work takes place in the beginning of a period, i.e. before the 
workers decide whether to send their children to work or to school. In order to identify 
the interests of the different groups, we examine how p – the severity of the penalty – 
influences the utility of the different groups in the population. The only politically 
active age group that is affected and therefore influences the political determination of 
the penalty are the young adults.  The political decision influences the young adults 
through their next-period wages since a higher penalty results in more parents sending 
their children to school in period t which, in turn, implies that the share of skilled 
workers increases in period t+1. As a consequence the skilled workers’ wages fall and 
the unskilled workers’ wages rise in t+1. In addition to this wage effect, the utility of 
the parents sending their children to work in period t decreases because they 
potentially suffer a larger penalty for sending their children to work.  
 Summed up, an increase in p has two effects: a first period direct penalty effect which 
negatively affects the parents who send their children to work, and a second period 
indirect income effect which is positive for all young unskilled workers and negative 
for all young skilled workers. Notice, that the old adults have no stake in the political 
decision because the income effect materializes only after they have retired and the 
penalty affects only parents of children who are subject to compulsory schooling. 
Clearly, the young skilled workers unambiguously lose from a higher penalty and the 
resulting lower incidence of child labor, whereas the young unskilled workers gain if 
we assume that the income effect on the poorest of the unskilled workers (i.e. those 
who send their children to work) dominates the penalty effect. One might argue that   13
under these circumstances the unskilled parents could simply coordinate their 
behavior, i.e. they could agree to send their children to work even if the government 
deserts the interests of the poor and does not enforce the existing child labor laws. The 
uneducated masses are, however, caught in a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation and cannot 
enforce their agreement without an outside agency such as the police.  
Drawing on the seminal work of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), we portray the 
political process with the help of a political support maximizing government. The 
utility of the educated upper class enters the political support function with a weight of 
α, whereas the utility of the uneducated masses enters with the weight  1- α. The 
exogenously given parameter α  measures the degree of political repression of the 
uneducated masses by the oligarchy of the educated elite. If α is close to unity, the 
government closely follows a policy advocated by the elite. If, on the other hand, α  is 
close to zero, the uneducated masses constitute a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” A 
true democracy would give each citizen the same weight; in this case α would be 
equal to the population share of the educated citizens in our model.   
  To be more specific, we use the following political support function of the 
government: 
(12)                        
*2 *2
1* 1* () ( 1 ) .
u s
u s
bb work school work school
iu i iu i js j js j bb M p U db U db U db U db αα   =− + + +     ∫∫ ∫∫ 
The first terms on the RHS in (12) measures the welfare of the young unskilled 
workers who send their children to work and to school, respectively. The interest of 
the uneducated masses enters the political support function with the weight 1-α. The 
second term measures the welfare of the young skilled workers sending their children   14
to work and to school, respectively. The interest of the educated elite enters the 
political support function with the weight α.    
We assume now that the political-economic system is in a steady state whenever a 
policy decision with respect to the penalty level p is made. The idea behind this rather 
innocent assumption is that this kind of policy is only infrequently revised so that the 
system will in the meantime arrive at a state close to the long-run equilibrium. We thus 
proceed from an initial equilibrium exhibiting child labor (1-δ* = µ* = ω* < 1), and a 
penalty level p that is set such that political support M is at a maximum. If the political 
system now becomes more repressive, i.e. more responsive to the interests of the 
educated elite (α increases), this will give rise to an endogenous policy adjustment 
described in our 
 
Proposition 2: 
Starting out from a steady state, an increase in political repression, i.e. an increase in 
the parameter α, will decrease the penalty p for parents who are detected to send their 






. As a consequence the incidence of child labor will, of 
course, increase.  
 
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix 2.   15
 
4.  Political repression and child labor: Empirical evidence 
In this section we test the hypothesis (expressed in Proposition 2) that political 
repression, ceteris paribus, increases the incidence of child labor. In the developed 
countries, to be sure, child labor is negligible; this is why the international institutions 
that are concerned with the phenomenon of child labor focus their attention on the 
developing countries. We therefore do not include the developed countries (that all 
enjoy political freedom) in our sample; doing so would also bias the estimation results 
in favor of our hypothesis.
9    
Moreover, our hypothesis does not relate to countries which have had or still have a 
communist regime; these countries, even though they did or still do exhibit a great 
deal of political repression, cannot be portrayed as an oligarchy of an educated elite. In 
the communist systems children were generally considered to represent the new 
generation of socialist men and women who would be in a position to build the 
communist society that was supposed to loom on the horizon. For this declared 
objective (and maybe also for the politically more tangible objective of indoctrination 
in order to stabilize the regime) the communist governments followed a long-run 
education policy in which schooling of the masses played an important role. In any 
                                                           
9 Rated as developed countries are only those countries that were already developed in 
1970, the beginning of our panel. Our sample includes, however, countries that 
reached the status of a developed country after 1970 such as the European country 
Turkey, the OPEC countries, South Korea etc. A complete list of the countries 
included in our sample is to be found in Appendix 2.    16
event, child labor is not an issue in a true communist system. We therefore do not 
include these countries in our sample either. 
After having excluded developed and (formerly) communist countries, data 
availability allows us to build a panel with a maximum of 103 countries for the years 
1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  
For our empirical test we need, first of all, data on child labor incidence and on 
political repression. Moreover, theoretical considerations and previous empirical work 
suggest the inclusion of several control variables. The variables that we employed in 
our regressions are described below. 
 
3.1 Data description 
Our endogenous variable child labor incidence (CHILDLABOR) is defined as the 
share of children (between 10 and 14 years) who are active in the labor force. Labor 
force activity is defined as working for wage or salary (in cash or in kind) for at least 1 
hour during the reference period. We use the data set compiled by the ILO which is 
available from the World Bank Indicators. Like all official data on child labor, also 
this data set is likely to suffer from underreporting. These inevitable problems 
notwithstanding, the ILO data has the advantage of being compatible with the 
internationally accepted definitions; they are therefore suitable for cross-country 
comparisons (cf. Ashagrie, 1993). 
With respect to the explanatory variables, the economic literature clearly stipulates 
that family income is the single most important household level determinant of child 
labor. Following the empirical literature, we use GDP per capita (GDP).    17
As a proxy variable measuring the absence of capital market imperfections Dehejia 
and Gatti (2002) use the ratio of domestic credit extended to the private sector and 
GDP (CREDIT). For lack of a better measure we also use this variable even though we 
are well aware that in developing countries many self-help institutions have developed 
in the shadow economy that provide substitutes for official bank loans (cf. Montiel et 
al., 1993). 
 Cigno (2000) empirically investigates the influence of the number of children per 
family on the parents’ decision whether to send their children to work or to school and 
finds a positive effect. We also tried this determinant of child labor and use as our 
proxy variable the share of the children up to age 14 in the population (CHILDREN). 
The CHILDREN variable captures an economic effect (working through income per 
family member) as well as some socio-economic effect emanating from the generally 
perceived role of the family. A second socio-economic variable that is likely to 
influence child labor incidence is the degree of urbanization of a given society. We 
use the share of a country’s population living in an urban environment (URBAN) to 
capture the respective effect on the child labor market. While children in the rural 
sector are mainly employed in agricultural activities such as cattle herding, in urban 
areas children are mainly employed in the trade, production and service sectors. 
Although urban child labor is more in the limelight of the media, the percentage of 
working children is, according to new estimates (see ILO, 2002), twice as high in rural 
areas. 
In our empirical study we test two major political-economic hypotheses. The first one 
has been emphasized by Shelburne (2001) who argues that an open economy will, 
ceteris paribus, be less prone to child labor, because general education has no adverse   18
effects on the wage rate of the skilled workers if the factor price equalization 
mechanism of international trade is at work. An alternative route of influence would 
be that open economies are more inclined to enforce their child labor legislation in 
order to avoid trade sanctions. We measure the openness of an economy by using the 
standard approach which associates openness with the ratio of exports plus imports 
and GDP (TRADE).
10 The second political-economic hypothesis is the one we 
developed in the previous sections: child labor incidence increases as the political 
system becomes more repressive. We measure political repression with the help of the 
Political Rights Index of Freedomhouse (POLREPR). Since its inception in the 1970s 
the Freedom in the World Survey has provided an annual evaluation of political rights 
and civil liberties throughout the world.
11 The Survey  measures freedom in all 
countries and territories by using a single standard; it ranks the covered countries and 
territories on the basis of observed government-induced restrictions of liberty rather 
than on policy platforms or legislation. The  Political Rights Index employs criteria 
such as  „Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority 
elected through free and fair elections?„ or „Are the people free from domination by 
the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic 
oligarchies, or any other powerful groups?“ (cf. Freedomhouse, 2003). The higher the 
value of the POLREPR index the more repressive is the political system.  
Apart from these major political-economic hypotheses we test three more hypotheses 
that also have some political-economic flair. Shelburne (2001, p. 368) advanced the 
                                                           
10 This measure is not uncontroversial. Bretschger and Hettich (2002), for example, 
argue that the foreign trade share should be adjusted for country size. 
11 As there are no Values for 1970, the Values of 1972 have been used instead.   19
hypothesis that the larger a country (assuming that it is not completely closed), the 
more likely child labor is to reduce the welfare of the non-child-labor factors, and thus 
the less likely is the practice of child labor in the economy. We use a dummy variable 
for small countries (SMALLCTR) to capture this potential effect. Moreover, it 
suggests itself to include foreign aid (AID) and foreign direct investments (FDI) 
received  in order to check whether these flows (both measured as a share of GDP) are 
targeted at countries that are in line with the political outlook of the donor or host 
countries.   
In some regressions we include dummy variables that capture the countries’ 
geography, predominant religion, natural resources, and whether the country has 
adopted international conventions dealing with child labor standards.  
 
3.2 Econometric implementation and results 
Like Gatti and Dehejia (2002) we estimate an OLS and a Tobit specification of our 
regression equation. Since child labor incidence cannot be negative and in a 
considerable number of countries included in our sample child labor incidence is 
negligible, our data set of the endogenous variable is left censored. OLS thus might 
not be appropriate in this context. The Tobit specification accounts for the mass point 
in the distribution of the endogenous variable and reacts, moreover, less sensitive to 
outliers; the Tobit specification therefore appears to be more appropriate. Since, 
however, only about 13 percent of our child labor data points assume the value zero, 
the OLS estimates should not differ too much from the Tobit estimates; we thus use 
the OLS estimates as a robustness check.  
Our empirical analysis employs the following baseline specification:    20
(17)    CHILDLABORit= α + β1LNGDPit + β2CREDITit + β3URBANit + β4TRADEit + 
                                    β5POLREPRit+εit  
 
Notice, that the income variable LNGDP is the logarithmic transform of the original 
variable GDP.  
The OLS results are reported in table 1 and the Tobit results in table 2. In a first 
regression we only include the economic explanatory variables LNGDP and CREDIT. 
In column 2 the influence of the socio-economic variable URBAN is added. The 
political-economic variables TRADE and POLREPR are, finally, included in column 
3.  
As we expected, the results reported in tables 1 and 2 are quite similar; the Tobit 
estimates do have, however, a slightly higher adjusted R-squared. The estimates 
presented in the first columns indicate that a large part of the variance in child labor 
incidence across countries and over time can be explained by economic factors. As 
expected, a higher income and easier access to private loans gives rise to a lower child 
labor incidence. The socio-economic variable URBAN, which we include in the 
second columns, also turns out to exert a significant influence on child labor. Child 
labor incidence is significantly lower in urban environments. In the third columns we 
test the political-economic hypotheses. Both political-economic variables included 
have a statistically significant influence on the prevalence of child labor. As our 
hypothesis suggests, political repression has a positive effect on child labor incidence. 
Openness to international trade is also significant and has the anticipated negative 
sign.    21
In order to make our estimates more comparable with other empirical studies we show 
in column 4 of table 2 the results of our baseline Tobit estimation (table 2, column 3) 
when the industrial countries are included in the sample.  Our base-line result remains 
unaltered. 
 
3.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
To check for robustness of our results presented in tables 1 and 2, we have included 
additional explanatory variables in our baseline regression. The results are 
summarized in tables 3 and 4.  
The regressions presented in table 3 extend our baseline regression (table 2, column 3) 
by adding various dummy variables. In column 1 we test whether Islamic countries do 
have a significantly different incidence of child labor from other countries. Since 
nearly all of the OPEC countries are Islamic,
12 we also have included an OPEC 
dummy to control for the effect of oil-related affluence. The Islamic dummy is 
negative but not quite significant at the 10% level; the OPEC countries, however, 
clearly have, ceteris paribus, a significantly lower child labor incidence. Notice that 
the POLREPR variable’s impact is not altered by the inclusion of these additional 
explanatory variables. Thus, although most OPEC countries are ruled by rather 
autocratic regimes, these countries are characterized by a relatively low incidence of 
child labor. In these countries oil is the most important source of income, and a part of 
this source of government income is probably used to implement budgetary policies 
that combat child labor, partly, maybe, in order to stabilize the established political 
order. On the other hand, it is questionable whether Islamic countries in general 
                                                           
12 The only exception is Venezuela.   22
exhibit any special characteristics with respect to child labor even though one may 
have conjectured that the “book-based” Islamic culture and the fact that the female 
labor participation rate is traditionally very low in Islamic countries would give rise to 
a relatively low child labor incidence. Also notice that the income variable LNGDP is 
not significantly affected by the inclusion of the OPEC dummy. 
In all the following estimates we retain the OPEC dummy since the incidence of child 
labor evidently is reduced by oil-related affluence. In column 2 of table 3 we add 
continent dummies. The dummy for the sub-Saharan countries is positive and highly 
significant. This could be interpreted to imply that in these countries specific cultural 
factors are at work which account for an additional child labor incidence of about ten 
percentage points. Since many African countries have rather repressive political 
regimes, it is perhaps surprising that this collinearity does not appear to greatly 
influence the estimate of our crucial political-economic variable POLREPR  which 
retains significance at the standard 1% level. Notice, however, that the estimate of the 
coefficient of the CREDIT variable is substantially reduced and is not significant 
anymore even at the 5% level (the p-statistic is 0.056). To be sure, the socio-economic 
substance of the continent dummies is quite elusive; these variables serve well as 
robustness tests but do not convey much information about the determinants of child 
labor. We therefore decided not even to retain the SUBSAHARA dummy whose 
coefficient is clearly different from the other continent dummies in our further 
robustness tests. To show that this strategy does not affect our final result, we will 
however return to the continent dummies in our last regression.  
 
In column 3 of table 3 we check whether countries with a population under one 
million are special. The variable SMALLCTRY is not significant and has no   23
substantial effect on the other variables. Unlike Shelburne (2001) we thus cannot find 
any empirical support for his hypothesis. In column 4 we include a dummy for the 
countries that ratified the ILO resolution 138 against child labor. Just as the dummy 
variable SMALLCTRY the ILO138 dummy does not have an immediate statistically 
significant influence on child labor incidence either. The international promise to take 
measures against child labor thus does not have an Immediate influence on actual 
policies. Again, notice that the estimates for our crucial variable POLREPR are not 
affected by the inclusion of these additional variables.  
In table 4 we first include variables capturing capital inflows. In column 1 we add 
foreign direct investments as an explanatory variable to our baseline regression. The 
FDI coefficient is positive but statistically by no means significant.
13  The number of 
included observations is substantially smaller in this regression as compared to the 
baseline regression since the FDI (and AID) data are not available for all countries in 
our sample and are not yet available for the year 2002 in general. The baseline results 
are however not affected by this reduction of sample size. In column 2 we add foreign 
aid (AID). Because of the smaller sample size the z-values are somewhat reduced, the 
main exceptions being TRADE and POLREPR (the corresponding estimate without 
AID is shown in column 3). AID varies positively with CHILDLABOR and this effect 
is significant at the 1% level. This result is also interesting from a normative point of 
view since it indicates that while foreign aid for humanitarian reasons may be a 
legitimate response to an observed high incidence of child labor, a policy measure that 
                                                           
13 On the relationship between political repression and FDI see Harms and Ursprung 
(2002) or Busse (2003).   24
is likely to help to cure the evil would be to allow the developing countries full access 
to the world market.  
In column 4 we introduce the explanatory variable CHILDREN that measures family 
size. The variable indeed has the predicted positive coefficient and is highly 
significant: a large number of children reduces the disposable family income per 
household member and thus makes parents more inclined to send their children to 
work. The inclusion of this variable is, however, not unproblematic from an 
econometric point of view. First, it appears possible that family size depends on the 
admissibility of child labor since in a society that is predisposed to tolerate child labor, 
poor parents have an additional incentive to produce offspring. Moreover, the variable 
CHILDREN is highly correlated with the variable POLREPR.  The combined effect of 
the exogeneity and the collinearity problems does however not appear to have any 
dramatic influence on our results even though it may responsible for the slight drop in 
significance of our pet variable POLREPR. Notice also that for obvious reasons the 
family-size variable CHILDREN which is supposed to capture the effect if income per 
family member somewhat reduces the size of the coefficient of the original income 
variable LNGDP. The last regression in column 5 is identical to the previous 
regression with the exception that it also includes the continent dummies (not shown)
14 
that we have already used above (cf. table 3, column 2). The inclusion of the continent 
dummies reduces the estimated coefficients of the variables CREDIT (as in regression 
2, table 3) and AID whose coefficients are not significantly different from zero 
                                                           
14 The coefficients of the continent dummies ASIA, NORTHAFR and LATINAM are 
again not significantly different from zero, whereas the coefficient of SUBSAHARA 
amounts to 9.08 and is with a z-statistic of 4.27 significant at the 1% level.   25
anymore. The influence on the political-economic variables TRADE and POLREPR 
is, however, very modest. 
Summed up, we arrive at the conclusion that our robustness check supports the 
hypothesis that political repression gives, ceteris paribus, rise to a higher child labor 
incidence in developing countries.    26
4. Conclusion 
Even though child labor is forbidden by law in most developing countries, child labor 
is still widespread in the third world. We developed in this paper a political-economic 
model that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labor legislation. Assuming a 
closed-economy overlapping-generations model with skilled and unskilled workers, 
we show that autocratic governments dominated by well-educated elites have no 
incentive to strictly enforce any child labor regulations since doing so would increase 
the supply of skilled labor with detrimental effects on the wage rate of the ruling 
elites’ clans. This argument gives rise to the empirically testable hypothesis that the 
prevalence of child labor is, ceteris paribus, the higher the more the government is 
dominated by such autocratic elites.  
To test this hypothesis, we use a panel data set of 103 developing countries for seven 
years between 1970 and 2002. Based on previous empirical investigations of child 
labor, we add a variable which measures the degree of political repression in a country 
as a proxy for the degree of autocratic government capture by educated elites. Our 
results are in accordance with the conclusion of previous empirical studies with 
respect to the standard explanatory variables of child labor incidence. The political 
repression variable turns out to have a significant impact on the incidence of child 
labor as predicted by the model. To check our results’ robustness, we carried out both 
OLS and a Tobit estimations and we examined whether our results remain stable when 
non-standard explanatory variables are included. The two estimation techniques and 
the various specifications of the estimation equation have no significant influence on 
our baseline estimates. We are thus confident in concluding that a policy of supporting 
any moves towards political liberalization is also helpful in combating child labor.    27
Appendix 1: Numerical example of the dynamic adjustment following an 
increase in the penalty p 
Consider the following numerical values of the model’s parameters: C=0, E=0.1, yc= 
0.2266, π=0.5, p=0.1, aS = 1.2, au = 0.8, and qs = qu= 0.1. It is straight forward to show 
that µ=ω=1-δ=0.620148 defines the steady state of the dynamic system: if ω=0.62 
(62% of the labor force is skilled) then (see equations 7) 
*
u b =1.62 (i.e. the poorest 62% 
of the unskilled workers send their children to work) and 
*
s b =1.23 (i.e. the poorest 
23% of the skilled workers send their children to work). Thus, the share 1-δ of 
children going to school amounts to 1-δ=(0.62)(2-1.23)+(1-0.62)(2-1.62)=0.62 
which shows that the share of skilled workers will also be 0.62 in the next generation.  
Starting out from this steady state we now increase in period 1 the penalty p from 
p0=0.1 to  p =0.15 and leave it there for all following periods. The following table 
shows how the critical values 
*
u b  and 
*
s b , the shares of the skilled work force, and the 
share of children going to school changes in the course of the adjustment process.  
The direct penalty effect decreases in the first period the share of parents who send 
their children to work: 
*
s b  and 
*
u b  become smaller. This increases in the second period 
and thereafter the share of skilled workers: µ, and with a time lag, ω increase. The 
indirect wage effect further decreases the share of uneducated parents sending their 
children to work (
*
u b  continues to decrease) whereas it increases the share of educated 
parents who do so (
*
s b  increases after t=1). The effect on the behavior of the 
uneducated parents is however stronger than the effect of the educated parents so that 
the aggregate wage effect is still favorable (µ and ω continuously increase). After a   28
few periods the system is close to the new steady state in which the share of educated 
individuals is much higher than in the original steady state (91% as compared to 62%).             
 
  µ  
*
s b  
*
u b    1 δ −   ω  
t=0  0.620148 1,230244 1.624102 0.620148 0.620148 
t=1  0.620148 1.041191 1.374524 0.832192 0.620148 
t=2  0.832192 1.050983 1.357824 0.897527 0.726170 
t=3  0.897527 1.064073 1.336581 0.908002 0.864860 
t=4  0.908002 1.067707 1.330890 0.908080 0.902765 
t=5  0.908080 1.068215 1.330102 0.907712 0.908041 
t=6  0.907712 1.068201 1.330123 0.907626 0.907896 
t→∞  0.907623 1.068175 1.330164 0.907623 0.907623 
 
                    
Appendix 2:    Proof of Proposition 2 
Let Mu(p) denote the political support provided by the unskilled voters. That is, 
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uu Ya q p ω ≡+ denote “basic” income in period 1 and 2, 
respectively (see also note 4). The first (second) term on the RHS of the above 
equation is the contemporaneous (or period 1) utility of the unskilled voters who send   29
their children to work (school) and the third term is the utility of all unskilled voters in 
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where K1 and K2 denote terms that do not depend on the parameter p.  

















ln( ) 1 2
2
u






u uu u u
u
Mp b b Y y b b
bY y Y E p b
pp p p Yb Y y
YY
bb Y C b p p
bY C Y





∂+ ∂ ∂ ∂
=+ − + − + − +
∂− ∂ ∂ ∂ +
∂∂ ∂∂
∂− ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂









ln( ) (1 ) ln( )
u
uu uu
uc u u u
bb Y











1 ln( ) ( )
uu
uc w o r k u bY y E p y b π +− −= , 
**
1 ln( ) ( )
uu






















∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
















 denotes the  “skilled-share” elasticity of “basic” income.    30
















The first-order condition of political support maximization thus has the following 
appearance: 
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Since  /0 p ω ∂∂ > , 0, 0 us ε ε >< , and the denominator is negative via the 
correspondence principle, all terms with the exception of 
*
u b π  are negative. A 





 to be negative is that the 
poor unskilled voters (these are the unskilled voters who send their children to work) 
are in favor of a higher penalty because the short-run penalty effect is smaller than the 
long-run income effect. Since this is an assumption that we introduced previously, 
Proposition 2 holds.       31
    Countries in the Sample 
 
 
  Africa  Asia  America  Oceania  Europe 
 
 Algeria**  Bahrain  Argentina    Fiji  Turkey 
 Angola*  Bangladesh  Bahamas  Papua  New  
 Benin*  Bhutan  Barbados  Guinea   
  Botswana*  Cambodia   Belize  Solomon Isl.  
 Burkina  Faso*  Inida  Bolivia   
 Burundi*  Indonesia  Brazil   
 Cameroon*  Iran  Chile 
 Cape  Verde*  Israeal  Colombia 
 Chad*  Jordan    Costa  Rica 
  Comoros*  Korea, Rep.  Dominican Rep.  
 Congo,  Dem.  Rep*  Kuwait  Ecuador 
  Congo, Rep*.   Lao PDR  El Salvador 
 Cote  d’Ivoire*  Lebanon  Guatemala 
 Egypt**  Malaysia  Guyana 
 Equatorial  Guinea*  Maldives  Haiti 
 Eritrea*  Nepal  Honduras 
 Ethiopia*  Oman  Jamaica 
 Gabon*  Pakistan  Mexico 
 Gambia*  Phillipines  Nicaragua 
 Ghana*  Saudi  Arabia    Panama 
 Guinea*  Singapore    Paraguay 
 Guinea-Bissau*  Sri  Lanka    Peru 
 Kenya*  Syria  Suriname 
 Lesotho*  Thailand  Trinidad/Tobago   
  Liberia*  United Arab Emirates  Uruguay 
 Madagascar*  Yemen  Venezuela 
 Malawi*     
 Mali*       









 Sierra  Leone* 







 Zambia*   
 Zimbabwe*   
  
          * sub-Saharan Africa     
          ** North Africa  
 
    32
 
Table 1: OLS estimates 
OLS  (1) (2) (3) 
LNGDP  -8.689421  -5.140301  -4.335710 
  (-23.65)**  (-9.92)**  (-7.65)** 
CREDIT   -0.070171   -0.062591   -0.054704 
  ( -3.89)**  (-3.68)**  (-3.01)** 
URBAN   -0.249471  -0.287019 
  (-9.34)**  (-10.22)** 
TRADE     -0.053256 
   (-5.16)** 
POLREPR     0.813345 
   (3.88)** 
[0.000] 
C  80.71194   66.83670   63.05790 
  (34.17)**  (24.71)**  (19.27)** 
    
Observations  643 638 570 
Ad. R-squared  0.595790  0.642690  0.675785 









Table 2: Tobit estimates 
TOBIT  (1) (2)  baseline  regression 
(3) 
(4) # 
LNGDP  -10.04921  -5.828711  -4.946218  -4.641048 
  (-24.30**  (-10.51)**  (-8.15)**  (-9.03)** 
CREDIT   -0.123478   -0.119802  -0.093304   -0.088445 
  (-6.00)**  (-6.27)**  (-4.63)**  (-4.97)** 
URBAN   -0.299619  -0.338046  -0.335061 
  (-10.49)**  (-11.19)**  (-12.22)** 
TRADE     -0.063206 -0.066020 
   (-5.65)** (-6.51)** 
POLREPR     0.571748  0.483790 




C   90.19559  73.93009  70.99577  69.47592 
  (33.88)**  (25.31)**  (19.88)**  (21.56)** 
     
Observations  643 638 570 709 
Ad. R-squared  0.636794  0.697763  0.715170  0.769374 
(z-statistic);  [p-statistic];  *)  significant at the 5% level;  **) significant at the 1% level 
 
# This regression includes also the following developed countries:: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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Table 3: Robustness check 1 
Tobit  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
LNGDP  -4.878824  -3.232843 -4.693385 -4.5821 
  (-7.77)**  (-5.59)** (-7.58)** (-7.38)** 
CREDIT    -0.093256  -0.036102 -0.096523 -0.1000 
   (-4.59)**  (-1.91)  (-4.7)**  (-4.95)** 
URBAN  -0.325081 -0.331677  -0.330558  -0.3357** 
    (-10.71)**  (-11.79)** (-10.91)** (-10.99) 
TRADE  -0.065421  -0.087276 -0.067754 -0.0662 
    (-5.89)**  (-8.48)** (-5.51)** (-5.91)** 
POLREPR    0.798777  0.675455 0.713590 0.719008 














ISLAM  -1.431190     
  (-1.52)     
ASIA   -0.332350     
   (-0.17)     
N-AFRICA   -0.843953    
   (-0.36)     
SUBSAHARA   10.57379     
   (5.42)**     
LATIN-AM   2.904569    
   (1.53)     
SMALLCTRY     0.638731 
(0.44) 
 
       
ILO138      0.544882 
        (0.57) 
C    70.03431  54.09353 69.07118 68.41665 
  (18.90)**  (13.37)** (18.87)** (18.52)** 
       
Observations  570  570 570 570 
Ad. R-squared  0.720751  0.773320 0.720574 0.719847 
(z-statistic);  [p-statistic];  *)  significant at the 5% level;  **) significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4: Robustness check 2 
 
Tobit  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)# 
LNGDP  -5.0091  -3.6285 -4.6473 -2.9233 -2.211762 
  (-7.20)**  (-5.03)** (-7.62)** (-4.05)** (-3.26)** 
CREDIT   -0.0863  -0-0916  -0.0985   -0.0610  -0.018302 
  (-3.86)**  (-4.22)** (-4.91)** (-2.77)** (-0.89) 
URBAN  -0.3143  -0.3483 -0.3325 -0.3212 -0.319062 
 (-9.26)**  (-10.89)**  (-11.08)** (-10.07)** (-10.48)** 
TRADE -0.0768  -0.0815 -0.0654 -0.0832 -0.098066 
  (-5.94)**  (-6.76)** (-5.89)** (-7.02)** (-8.89)** 











OPEC    -5.3456  -4.3823 -4.7080 -5.1123 -3.456736 
    (-3.08)**  (-2.67)** (-3.00)** (-3.17)** (-2.27)* 
FDI    0.0858      
 (0.89)      
AID       0.143289     0.111360  0.060148 
       (2.79)**    (2.20)*  (1.29) 
CHILDREN         0.488345  0.332084 
     (4.98)**  (3.69)** 
C 70.75023 62.07897  68.83233    36.83613  35.03447 
 (17.21)**  (13.88)**  (19.00)**    (5.52)**  (5.38)** 
       
Observations  491  517 570 517 517 
Ad. R-squared  0.709649  0.726680 0.720397 0.736466  0.777157 
(z-statistic);  [p-statistic];  *)  significant at the 5% level;  **) significant at the 1% level 
 
# including continent dummies (not shown) 
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Table 6: Data Sources  
Variable Explanation  Source 
CHILDLABOR  number of children aged 10-14 that active in the labor force divided by 
the total number of children aged 10-14 
WDI 2003 
(LN)GDP  (logarithm of)  per capita GDP in constant U.S. dollars  WDI 2003 
CREDIT  volume of domestic bank credit extended to the private sector divided 
by GDP  
WDI 2003 
URBAN  share of the total population living in urban   WDI 2003 
TRADE  sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP  WDI 2003 
POLREPR  Political Right Index   Freedomhouse 2003 
ILO138  1 for countries which ratified the ILO convention 138, otherwise 0  ILOLEX 2003 
SMALLCNTRY  1 for countries which have a population below one million, otherwise 0  WDI 2003 
OPEC  1 for members of OPEC, otherwise 0  OPEC 2003 
ISLAM   1 for countries in which Islam is the predominant religion (largest 
religious group), otherwise 0  
Fischer Weltalmanach 
CHILDREN  number of children below the age of 15 years divided by total 
population 
WDI 2003 
FDI  gross foreign direct investment inflow divided by GDP   WDI 2003 
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